# How Cyber Security Threat Modeling keeps your Organization Innovative

Secure IoT Design thanks to THREATGET



#### AGENDA

- 1. A brief introduction
- 2. What is ThreatGet?
- 3. The STRIDE Framework
- 4. Systems Development
- 5. IoT-Security Situation
- 6. Innovation: Security-by Design with ThreatModeling
- 7. Conclusion







#### THE SPEAKER





#### Orsolya Németh

Trainer, Cunsultant and Speaker Sparx Services CE and LieberLieber

Co-founder: SIG WOMENinICT







#### WHO WE ARE

# LieberLieber

#### OUR EXPERTISE

- Model-based Systems Engineering
- Configuration Management for Models
- Integration Enterprise Architect with other Tools



#### KEY Infrastructure Issues

- Austria's largest research and technology organization
- Partner to industry and public institutions



# CYBER SECURITY MODELING WITH METHODOLOGY- THREATGET



• ThreatGet is a tool based on Sparx Systems Enterprise Architect that helps in the design phase of many projects to search for potential threats:









### THE STRIDE THREAT MODEL


• Is a Framework of security risks developed

Bedrohung	Betrifft	Definition
<u>S</u> poofing	Authentifikation	Vortäuschung falscher Identität, Zugriff auf vertrauliche Informationen und Daten
<u>T</u> ampering	Integrität	Manipulation von (presistenten) Daten
<u>R</u> epudiation	Zutritt	Nicht beweisbare Aktion eines Angreifers
<u>l</u> nformation disclosure	Vertraulichkeit	Angreifer sieht Daten die er nicht sehen soll
D enial of service	Verfügbarkeit	Verfügbarkeit einer Anwendung stören
<u>E</u> levation of privilege	Autorisierung	Angreifer findet Weg um seine Privilegien zu erhöhen






#### SYSTEM DEVELOPMENT 1/3








#### SYSTEM DEVELOPMENT 2/3







#### SYSTEM DEVELOPMENT 3/3






## IOT Security Situation





#### THE CHALLANGES



# "In 2020, 54.6% of incidents were attacks by black-hat hackers ..."

Quelle: Upstream Security Global Automotive Cybersecurity Report 2021



#### **EXAMPLES FROM 2020**



- January
  - *4,118 vehicles were stolen in India with electronic devices r*
  - A Mobileye 630 PRO hack fooled the ADAS of a Tesla Model X February
  - 19 security vulnerabilities were found in a Mercedes-Benz E-Class April
  - Hackers took full control of an OEM's corporate network
- August
  - A hacker managed to gain control of Tesla's entire connected car
  - More than 300 vulnerabilities found in over 40 ECUs





## LEGAL STANDARDIZATIONS & REGULATIONS THREATGET

#### The US

- CCPA (California Consumer Privacy Act) U.S. state-level privacy law.
- DIGI (Developing and Growing the Internet of Things) Act National strategy for the IoT.
- NIST (National Institute of Standards and Technology) Privacy Framework V 1.0.

#### The UK

• DCMS (Department for Digital, Culture, Media and Sport) - Introduced security requirements for all IoT devices.


#### The EU

• ENISA (EU Cybersecurity Agency) study titled: "Essential Security Recommendations for IoT in the Context of Critical Information Infrastructures."



# UNECE WORLD FORUM FOR CONTRACTION OF VEHICLE REGULATIONS THREATGET

- UNECE WP29 defines requirements for type approval
- Members are:
  - Type approval authorities
  - Certification bodies
  - OEM and Tier 1
- Two new regulations on:
  - Cybersecurity
  - Software Updates





#### UNECE WP 29 REGULATION ON CYBER SECURITY



- Vehicle manufacturer, Supplier und Service providers need a Cyber Security Management System (CSMS)
- CSMS covers Development, Production und "Post-Production":
  - Management of cybersecurity in the Organisation
  - Management of risks related to the vehicle
  - Management of new Cyberthreats andvulnerabilities

#### 7.3. Requirements for vehicle types



The manufacturer shall have a valid Certificate of Compliance for the Cyber Security Management System relevant to the vehicle type being approved.

However, for type approvals prior to 1 July 2024, if the vehicle manufacturer can demonstrate that the vehicle type could not be developed in compliance with the CSMS, then the vehicle manufacturer shall demonstrate that cyber security was adequately considered during the development phase of the vehicle type concerned.




## SECURITY-BY DESIGN

#### Innovation through Threat Modeling



#### THREATGET










#### **Detected Threats**

Threats List




#### 

Title	Туре	Description	Impact	Likelihood
16 Spoof me	Spoofing	Forge or manipulate c	Major 🗸 🗸 🗸	Likely ~
17 Spoofing	Spoofing	Sensor Control Unit T	Moder ~	Possible ~
18 Message	Repudiation	Packets or messages	Major ~	Likely ~
19 Gaining u	InformationD	Confidentiality of data	Moder ~	Possible ~
20 Extract D	InformationD	Accessing data store	Trivial ~	Remote ~
21 Cause the	DenialofSer	DoS on Telematics C	Critical ~	Certain ~
22 Attempt to	ElevationofP	Elevation of privilege	Moder ~	Possible ~
23 Sensor C	Tampering	Sensor Control Unit T	Moder ~	Possible ~
24 Spoof me	Spoofing	Forge or manipulate c	Major ~	Likely ~
25 Spoofing	Spoofing	Telematics Control U	Moder ~	Possible ~
26 Message	Repudiation	Packets or messages	Major ~	Likely ~
27 Gaining u	InformationD	Confidentiality of data	Moder ~	Possible ~
28 Extract D	InformationD	Accessing data store	Trivial ~	Remote ~
29 Cause the	DenialofSer	DoS on Sensor Contr	Critical ~	Certain ~
30 Attempt to	ElevationofP	Elevation of privilege	Moder v	Possible v


#### 46 Threats Cyber Security Risk Assessment








#### THREATGET





## THREAT MODELLING WITH THREATGET



Security propertiesn



## CONCLUSION




## THREATGET FOR AUTOMOTIVE (ISO/SAE 21434, UNECE)



- Threat Catalog ٠
  - UNECE •
  - ETSI, ITU, ISO/SAE •
  - AIT Analyses
  - Cont. Updates
- ISO/SAE compatible ٠ Workflow
  - **Risik** analysis
- Extensible by user ٠

Communication Element (AIT) Reporting Communication Element (A., Kedium (AIT) Wired Bus Communication ... Se Wired Communication Elem. Wireless Bus Communicatio. 20 Million Commission F





- Automated cybersecurity analysis of design
  - Avoidance of vulnerabilities and insecure architecture
- Supports system design and risk analysis according to ISO/SAE 21434
  - Complience with ISO/SAE 21434 becomes mandatory
- Knows current and future threats: Threat database updates

 Easy verification of system already on the market





# THANK YOU!

#### Contact us: orsolya.nemeth@sparxservices.eu

